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Re: I-D ACTION:draft-cruickshank-ipdvb-sec-00.txt, "ULEsec"



Thanks Haitham for the security extension draft.
Most issues that we discussed in our SATNEX workshop
are already adressed in the draft.
I hope the "ULE-Sec" extension will become standard soon.
Link-layer security is a valuable part of a "multiple layer security"
solution, especially since upper layer security protocols are not used,
not available or somehow incompatible
(like end-to-end transport-mode IPsec together with TCP-split).
Satellites definately need kind of a "wired equivalent privacy".
And protection against traffic analysis is a very unique feature of
this security layer.

I attached a PDF about how the "ULE-Sec" subsystems could be structured.
We discussed this already in our workshop.
Looking at the DVB-RCS-Sec spec. there is much to improve.
A control plane based on UDP messages would be easier to realize
than closed L2 solutions.
On the other hand, signalling on layer 2 would be closer to the receiver
hardware and thus more secure in authentication (smartcard as in GSM/UMTS).
IPsec, IKE, GSAKMP, MIKEY are a good "study examples", but surely
need to be modified for the satellite L2 approach.
What about re-using code from IKE implementations KAME (racoon) or
Free S/WAN (Pluto)?
At this opportunity, some problems of IPsec could be removed,
like the "aggressive mode" or AH-only.
The big benefit over IPsec is, that no tunnelling is required.
IPsec transport mode would have to be end-to-end and
can't be used just to secure the satellite link.

At the workshop, Pauline Chan had the idea to integrate a billing system.
Strong RSA/EC authentication with smardcards in the Satcom
receivers would be a good base for a billing system.
Fraud protection should be done in the Satcom terminals.
Using UDP for key-exchange signalling in attached computers
might be dangerous as the secret keys could be stolen.
A closed terminal solution with L2 signalling
directly linked to the smardcard reduces the
intrusion risk dramatically.
Some other ideas could be derived from the UMTS
access security architecture.

Anyway, I guess we still need lots of discussion
to come to a high-end security solution for the satellite link.

Regards,
Frank

--
Dipl.-Ing. Frank Hermanns
Institut für Kommunikation und Navigation
DLR - Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt
D-82234 Wessling
Tel: +49 8153 28-2899
Fax: +49 8153 28-2844

Attachment: ule-sec arch.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document